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... The Case For Equality In Athletics
D O WOMEN HAVE THE RIGHT TO HAVE the opportunity to partici-
pate on an equal basis as members of male teams? If the answer
is "yes," the effects would have far-reaching consequences in pro-
fessional and amateur athletics, college and university competition,
and public high school athletic programs.
The major emphasis of this note concerns litigation by female
students in public high schools who have attempted to obtain per-
mission to perform on previously all-male teams. The courts have
been careful to restrict their decisions to non-contact sports such as
tennis,1 golf,2 skiing,3 track,4 and swimming.' Cases related to con-
tact sports such as baseball,' and sex discrimination in interscholastic
sports in general, 7 are now pending.
In professional athletics, women's attempts to gain entry into
certain heretofore all-male sports have generated some litigation.
Recent decisions have permitted women to compete as jockeys.0
Progress has also been made in wrestling,9 bowling,0 and baseball.11
New York courts have ruled that height and weight requirements for
employment as a baseball umpire inherently discriminated against
women because the Baseball League did not sustain its burden of
proof of showing the requirement to be a "bona fide occupational
qualification."12 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prevents
discrimination in employment on the basis of sex.12 The Equal Em-
' Morris v. Michigan State Bd. of Educ., 472 F.2d 1207 (6th Ci. 1973).
'Haas v. South Bend Community School Corp., 289 N.E.2d 495 (Ind. 1972).
3Brenden v. Independent School Dist., 342 F. Supp. 1224 (D. Minn. 1972, aff'd 477 F.2d
1292 (8th Cir. 1973).
4Hollander v. Connecticut Interscholastic Athletic Conference, Civil No. 124427 (Conn.
Super. Ct., New Haven County, March 29, 1971).
'Complaint to Department of Human Rights, City of St. Paul, Minn. 55102. A twelve-year-
old girl brought a sex discremination complaint against her high school and won the right
to compete for a place on the swimming team. See WOMEN'S RIGHTS L. RPTR., No. 2,
Spring, 1972, at 41.
6 Broderick v. Board of Educ., Civil No .....-(N.Y. Sup. Ct., filed....
' Ritacco v. Norwin School Dist., Civil No. 72-889 (W.D. Pa., filed .
8 Rubin v. Florida State Racing Comm'n, Civil No. 6819113 (11th Cit.
1968); Kusner v. Maryland Racing Comm'n, Civil No. 37044 (Md. Civ. Ct., Prince
George's County ,............. - .- .. .... 1968).
9 Hesseltine v. State Athletic Comm'n, 6 ll.2d 129, 126 N.E.2d 631 (1955). Bet see Calza-
della v. Dooley, 29 App. Div.2d 152, 286 N.Y.S.2d 510 (1968), where the court held that
a State Athletic Commission rule against granting wrestling licenses to female wrestlers was
not an unjust and unconstitutional discrimination against women.
"9 SPORTS ILLUSTRATFRD, Aug_ 2, 1971, at 44.
" New York Times, Aug. 22, 1971, §V. at 3, col. 8.
"2New York State Div. of Human Rights v. New York-Pa. Professional Baseball League, 36
App.Div.2d 364. 320 N.Y.S.2d 788 (1971), afl'd, 29 N.Y.2d 921, 279 N.E.2d 856 (1972).
342 U.S.C. §2000-c et. seq.
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ployment Opportunity Commission's guidelines on the bona fide oc-
cupational exception have construed this provision very narrowly.
They reject the proposition that an employer can refuse "to hire an
individual based on stereotyped characterizations of the sexes." 14
According to the Commission, the exception is primarily to apply
"where it is necessary for the purpose of authenticity of genuine-
ness , . . i.e., an actor or actress."1 Authority for sustaining this
view is Griggs v. Duke Power Co., a race case, which states:
What Congress has commanded is that any tests used must
measure the person for the job and not the person in the
abstract. 6
On the university level, The Higher Education Act of 1972,
effective June 23, 1972, contains provisions which prohibit sex dis-
crimination in all federally assisted programs. Title IX of the Higher
Education Act states:
No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex,
be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of,
or be subjected to discrimination under any education pro-
gram or activity receiving Federal financial assistance .... 1
Institutions cannot be required to grant "preferential or dis-
parate" treatment to members of one sex when an imbalance exists
with respect to the number or percentage of persons of one sex par-
ticipating in or receiving the benefits of federally assisted educa-
tional programs or activities. Therefore, pressure is now on the
various conferences to strike the word "male" from their eligibility
rules where such an imbalance can be shown, so that these schools
can keep federal funds. The Big Eight Conference has already
made such a determination.0 This action was taken to allow females
to participate in those sports recognized by the Conference - base-
ball, basketball, cross country, football, indoor and outdoor track,
golf, gymnastics, swimming, tennis, and wrestling.
1429 C.F.R. §1604.1 [a] [ii] (1972).
s 29 C.F.R. §1604.1 [a] [ivl [21 (1972).
16401 U.S. 424, 436 (1971).
T720 U.S.C. §1681. These sex discrimination provisions are patterned after Tide VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 which forbids discrimination on the basis of race, color, and na-
tional origin in all federally assisted programs.
1820 U.S.C.§1681 (b).
19Iowa State University, Kansas State University, Oklahoma State University, University of
Colorado, University of Kansas, University of Missouri, University of Nebraska, University
of Oklahoma.
2aBig Eight Conference Decision, March 2, 1973 meeting, Minute No. 2295, (2), at 1356.
It was voted, "That Conference Rule 2.1 be amended by the deletion of the word 'male,'"
thus enabling female participation.
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Public high schools have been attacked for discrimination against
female students in violation of the fourteenth amendment to the
Constitution which states that "No state shall . . . deny to any per-
son within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. ' 2 An
analysis of this premise follows.
State Action Under the Fourteenth Amendment
Jurisdiction has been predicated upon a showing that the various
State High School Athletic Associations and the defendant school
districts are persons acting under color of state law within the
meaning of 42 U.S.C. §1983.22 Following this, they must show a
denial of the equal protection of the laws under the fourteenth amend-
ment to the Constitution.
Under the fourteenth amendment, the equal protection demand
has been construed to apply only when "state action" is implicated.
The Supreme Court observed the expansion of activities involving
state action in United Stokes v. Guest:
The involvement of the State need not be either exclusive
or direct. In a variety of situations the Court has found state
action of a nature sufficient to create rights under the Equal
Protection Clause even though the participation of the State
was peripheral, or its action was only one of several co-opera-
tive forces leading to the constitutional violation.23
Reviewing court decisions finding the state action nexus in
private conduct impregnated with a state character,24 or "supported"
by the state," commentators have recognized that the inquiry should
candidly focus on whether the:
challenged action or inaction is of sufficient public concern
to warrant application of constitutional guarantees.2 6
State action was found in the conduct of a private entrepreneur
who held a liquor license because:
Inquiry should focus upon the alleged sphere of privacy and
autonomy in need of protection from federal intervention,
21 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1.
2Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of
any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States
or other persons within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges
or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the person injured in
an action of law, suit in equity or other proper proceedings for redress.
383 U.S. 745, 755-56 (1966).
" Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966).
25 Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
2Developments in the Law -Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. RFv. 1065, 1072, and n.54
(1969).
[Vol. 22:570
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as well as upon the customary search for some causal rela-
tion, however tenuous, between state activity and the dis-
crimination alleged.27
Significantly, after finding the requisite state action, the court
went on to declare inconsonant with the equal protection clause,
McSorley's century-old policy of excluding women patrons.2
The school systems at issue here all belong to a State High
School Athletic Association. Although membership in such an asso-
ciation is voluntary, there are 50 State High School Associations and
in order to compete with other members a school must belong. The
rules of the state associations are binding on its members.9 The 50
State Associations belong to the National Federation of State High
School Associations which represents approximately 22,000 schools
and 9,500,000 students.30 The National Federation cannot require
compliance to policy by its members. It is merely a joining together
of state associations for their mutual guidance and aid with a minimal
duplication of effort. Therefore, the Federation does not require its
state associations to sponsor interscholastic competition for girls par-
ticipating on girls' teams only against girls' teams. The Federation
merely advocates such sponsorship:
It believes girls' programs should be feminized in order to
encourage women to develop their leadership abilities.
Because no member of the National Federation is bound to do
what the Federation advocates, the state associations have various
rules concerning female participation on male teams. Because the
litigation is as current as it is, the number of states allowing girls
on boys' teams is in a state of flux.
Many states have rules comparable to those of the Ohio High
School Athletic Association.3 2 These rules require that boys' teams
must be composed of boys only, and girls' teams must be composed
of girls only, for interscholastic contests.3 Girls' teams are forbidden
to compete intersoholastically against a boys' team.'
"Seidenberg v. McSorleys' Old Ale House, Inc., 317 F. Supp. 593, 597 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
2Id.
29 E.g. OHIO HIGH SCHOOL ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION CONSTITUTION AND RULES 1972-1973,
Part I, Rule 1, §3.
30NATIONAL FEDERATION Or STATE HIGi SCHOOL AssocwroNS, 1972-1973 OFtiCkAL
HANDBOOK, at 5.
311I. at 30.
32 OHo HIGH SCHOOL ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION CONSTITUTION AND RULES 1972-1973. The
current rules are presently being revised and are experted to be less restrictive on male-
female competition.
33 d Part I, Rule 1., §2; Part III, Rule 2., §7.
'Id. Part III, Rule 2., §6.
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According to the provisions, no exceptions will be allowed, even
preventing mutual consent between contesting schools from waiving
the rules.3 Penalties for violations vary from a "warning," to "pro-
bation," to suspension from the Ohio State Association depending
on the violation. Decisions, normally made by the Commissioner, may
be appealed to the Board of ControlY6
Much pressure is on the State Athletic Associations to empha-
size that participation in interscholastic activities is voluntary, that
it is extracurricular, and that it is a highly coveted privilege.3 Con-
ceding all of these, a doubtful premise at best, courts have still found
the requisite state action. 8
The State Athletic Association is the means by which the
state and local boards of education and the member schools, all state
agencies, regulate their interscholastic athletic contests. A federal
district court in St. Augustine High School v. Louisiana High School
Athletic Ass'n39 refused to let words such as "voluntary" and "private"
dull its analysis, and stated:
For the state to devote so much time, energy and other re-
sources to interscholastic athletics and then to refer co-
ordination of those activities to a separate body cannot
obscure the real and pervasive involvement of the state in
the total program.4
Affirming, the Fifth Circuit stated:
There can be no substantial doubt that the conduct of the
affairs of [the Louisiana High School Athletic Associa-
tion] is state action in the constitutional sense.41
The factors considered relevant by the courts in the St. Augustine
case are the same as in those cases at issue here: public schools con-
stitute the large majority of the association; principals responsible
for carrying out the programs are state officers, state paid and
supervised; schools provide and pay for coaches, supply athletic
equipment, carry insurance on players and facilities, and supply
transportation to teams.4"
35J d. Part I, Rule 1, §3,
36d. Part I, Rule 1, §6.
3 7 NATIONAL FEDERATION OF STATE HIGH SCHOOL ASSOCIATIONS, 1972-1973 OFFICIAL
HANDBOOK, at 55.
1 Haas v. South Bend Community School Corp., 289 N.E.2d 495 (Ind. 1972).
39 270 F. Supp. 767 (E.D. La. 1967), af'd, 396 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1968).
41d.
4'396 F.2d 224, 227 (5th Cir. 1968).
421d. at 227-28; see also Mitchell v. Louisiana High School Athletic Ass'n, 430 F.2d 1155
(Sth Cir. 1970).
[Vol. 22:570
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Kelly v. Metropolitan County Bd. of Educ.3 relied on St. Augus-
tine and Oklahoma High School Athletic Ass'n. v. Bray" for the
conclusion that the Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association
is an instrumentality of the state for purposes of the fourteenth
amendment. 4 Factors considered relevant were these: the Associa-
tion was performing a public function by regulation of athletic func-
tions of public schools; its governing board was composed of public
school principals or superintendents; expenses of the association
were paid from revenue derived from games between member schools;
and many games were played at state-owned facilities.46 Thus, the
function of the association "closely identified [it] with state objec-
tives, and subjected it to constitutional limitations placed upon the
state."4'
Similarly, in Bray, the court stressed that
... although the Association is a creature of contract rather
than legislative action, it is a composite of public schools
governed by the Board of Control whose members are public
employees and are acting in such capacity."
Further, the court noted that the expenses of the Association are
paid from revenue that would otherwise be public revenues. Thus:
The rules of the Association are made by contract, but,
once made, ring with authority and are enforced as against
an individual in the name of the public interest under color
of the laws of the State of Oklahoma and consequently well
within the compulsion of 42 U.S.C. §1983.11
The above cases, and others,5 0 have been relied on by courts in
recent decisions where females challenged association rules for-
bidding them from playing on male teams, determining that the
act of state associations and school districts in administering their
programs is state action. 51
"293 F. Supp. 485 (D. Tenn. 1968).
321 F.2d 269 (10th Cit. 1963).
45 It has previously been determined that actions by public school corporations constitute state
action in the constitutional sense, See Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School
Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
46293 F. Supp. 485 (D. Tenn. 1968).
47 Ird,
-321 F.2d 269, 273 (10th Cir. 1963).
"Id.
"Butts v. Dallas Independent School Dist., 436 F.2d 728, 729 (5th Cit. 1971); Mitchell v.
Louisiana High School Ass'n, 430 F.2d 1155 (5th Cit. 1970); Lee v. Macon County Bd. of
Educ., 283 F. Supp. 194 (M.D. Ala, 1968).
sBrenden v. Independent School Dist., 342 F. Supp. 1224 (D. Minn. 1972), afj'd, 477 F.2d
1292 (8th Cir. 1973); Reed v. Nebraska School Activities Ass'n, 341 F. Supp. 258 (D. Neb.
1972); Haas v. South Bend Community School Corp., 289 N.E.2d 495 (Ind. 1972)
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In addition, in Brenden v. Independent School Dist.,5 2 the court
found that although the Minnesota State High School League is a
voluntary organization, the original allowance for public high schools
to join such an association or organization is authorized pursuant
to Minnesota Law. 3
Haas v. South Bend Community School Corp.54 overruled State
v. Lawrence Circuit Courts' insofar as it had determined that the
courts will not interfere with the enforcement or administration of
the constitution or by-laws of voluntary associations such as the
Indiana High School Athletic Association, and held that the actions
of the IHSAA are now judicially reviewable. s6
Haas, while indicating the IHSAA is a voluntary association of
approximately 438 high schools, a majority of which are tax-sup-
ported institutions, stressed that membership is contingent upon a
strict adherence to the rules and regulations of the IHSAA. Some
of the rules which indicate the entanglement of the state and the as-
sociations are:
The principal of each member school shall be the authorized
representative of his school and is responsible to the IHSAA
for the conduct of the athletic program. (Rule 3, §1) ; ...
Paid coaches, other than those regularly employed as full
time teachers by the trustees of the school, are prohibited
I . . (Rule 7, §1) ; . . . No games, meets, or tourneys, shall
be played by a member school without the sanction of the
Principal. (Rule 9, §1); . . . All inter-school athletic con-
tests shall be subject to the rules of the IHSAA and the
Board of Control. (Rule 9, §2).11
The court did not question the wisdom of the rules but used them
as an indication that
. . . the IHSAA imposes on its member schools and their
respective principals and coaches certain rules, duties and
responsibilities .... In the majority of cases, the salaries
of the respective principals and coaches are derived from
tax funds, athletic contests are held in, or on, athletic facil-
ities which have been constructed and maintained with tax
funds .... it is abundantly clear that the association's very
5342 F. Supp. 1223 (D. Minn. 1972), aJ'd, 477 T.2d 1292 (5th Cir. 1973).
M id.
s289 N.E.2d 495 (Ind. 1972).
s'240 Ind. 114, 162 N.E.2d 250 (1959).
s289 N.E.2d 495, 497 (Ind. 1972).
Id. at 497.
[Vol. 22:570
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existence is entirely dependent upon the absolute cooperation
and support of the public school systems of the State of
Indiana. The enforcement of the rules promulgated by the
IHSAA and adopted by the member schools may have a sub-
stantial impact upon the rights of students enrolled in these
tax supported institutions, and we conclude, therefore, that
the administration of interscholastic athletics by the IHSAA
should be considered to be "state action" within the meaning
of the Fourteenth Amendment. 8
Similar analogies are made in other cases to find the requisite
state action in athletic programs found to be discriminatory against
women.
Denial of Equal Protection Under the Fourteenth Amendment
The next issue to be decided is: does a rule of a state associa-
tion, enforced by member public schools, forbidding female partici-
pation in interscholastic athletic contests in competition with boys
deny female high school students equal protection under the four-
teenth amendment to the Constitution?
Two unreported court decisions have indicated that it does not.
In Gregorio v. Board of Education,59 the court rejected claims against
the exclusion of a female high school student from an all-male tennis
team when no such athletic opportunities were provided for her.
The judge pointed out that not all discrimination is unlawful and
that it was questionable whether the right which the woman was
claiming had been infringed- her right to equal use of the school
facilities - was actually a constitutional right.60
Another unreported decision, Hollander v. Connecticut Inter-
scholastic Athletic Conference,1 concerned a high school girl who
was kept off the cross country team. She sued the CIAC for a per-
manent injunction forbidding the defendant from enforcing any rule
or regulation forbidding the defendant from enforcing any rule or
regulation that discriminates against a school team or individual on
the basis of sex when engaged in cross country running and indoor
track. Relying on Brown v. Wells,62 the court held that the plaintiff
was not entitled to relief:
5Id. at 497, 498.
"'Docket No. C-198869 (N.J. Super. Ct., Monmouth County, March 16, 1971), a'd, Docket
No. A-127770 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. April 5, 1971); see WOMEN'S RIGHTS L. RPM.,
Vol 1, No- 1, July/August, 1971, at 39.
60 Id.
"Civil No. 124427 (Conn. Super. Ct., New Haven County, March 29, 1971); fee, WOMEN'S
RIGHTS L. RPTR., No. 2, Spring, 1972, at 41.
"181 N.W.2d 708, 712 (Minn. 1970).
073]
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Courts should not be called upon to arbitrate the reasonable-
ness of League rules unless objectors are prepared to demon-
strate that they are not supported by reason or adopted in
good conscience.' 3
The court then proceeded to reason as follows:
The present generation of our male population has not be-
come so decadent that boys will experience a thrill in defeat-
ing girls in running contests.... It could well be that many
boys would feel compelled to forego entering track events if
they were required to compete with girls on their own teams
or adversary teams .... In a world of sports, there is ever
present as a challenge, the psychology to win. With boys
vying with girls in cross-country running and indoor track,
the challenge to win, and the glory of achievement, at least
for many boys, would lose incentive and become nullified.
Athletic competition builds character in our boys. We do not
need that kind of character in our girls, the women of
tomorrow ....
Four decisions 5 have determined that the enforcement of state
high school association regulations prohibiting girls from partici-
pating on or against male teams is a denial of equal protection and
due process under the fourteenth amendment. A fifth case, Seldin v.
State Bd. of Educ.,j' was put on the inactive list until March, 1973,
pending the outcome of an experimental program established, whereby
a school or an individual student may apply to the association for
permission to allow girls to participate on a specified boys' team,
provided there is no girls' team of equal caliber.
These decisions have carefully based distinctions on whether or
not the case was brought as a class action 7 and whether or not the
school had comparable alternative programs available for the women. 8
The Supreme Court of the United States has developed two
standards of review for determining whether "state action" estab-
'3 Docker No. C-198869 (NJ. Super. Cr., Monmouth County, March 16, 1971), afl'd, Docket
No. A-127770 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. April 5, 1971).
4Id.
"SMorris v. Michigan State Bd. of Educ., 472 F.2d 1207 (6th Cir. 1973); Brenden v. Inde.
pendent School Dist., 342 F. Supp. 1224 (D. Minn. 1972), aff'd, 417 F.2d 1292 (8th Cir.
1973); Reed v. Nebraska School Activities Ass'n, 341 F. Supp. 258 (D. Neb. 1972); Haas
v. South Beod Community School Corp., 289 N.E.2d 495 (Ind. 1972).
"Civil No. 20272 (D.N.J. filed Jan. 31, 1972); see WOMEN'S RIGHTS L. RPTR., No. 2,
Spring, 1972, at 41).
" Brenden v. Independent School Dist., 342 F. Supp. 1224 (D. Minn. 1972).
6 Haas v. South Bend Community School Corp., 289 N.E.2d 495 (Ind. 1972).
[Vol. 22:570
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lishes a classification violative of the fourteenth amendment guarantee
that those similarly situated should be similarly treated. 69
A "reasonable relationship" test is generally the one applied:
does the classification bear a reasonable and just relation to a per-
missible state objective? Under this general test, if the purpose is a
permissible one and if the classification bears the required fair
relationship to that purpose, the constitutional mandate will be held
satisfied. 70
However, in two circumstances a more stringent test is applied.
When the "state action" affects "fundamental rights or interests,"
such as voting 7 or education, 72 or when the classification is made on
a basis "inherently suspect," the "most rigid scrutiny" is required.
Thus, state action distinguishing on the basis of race or ancestry
embodies a "suspect classification," and the burden shifts to the state
to show a "compelling state interest" to uphold its constitutionality.7 3
Changes in society's attitude toward women74 have forced a re-
examination of the premises underlying the "suspect classification"
doctrine. Although it is presumed reasonable for a state to dis-
tinguish between individuals on the basis of their ability or need,
it is impermissible to distinguish on the basis of congenital or im-
mutable biological traits of birth over which the individual has no
control. Such conditions include not only race, clearly within the
suspect classification doctrine, but, it is asserted, include also sex.
Sex has been recognized as a suspect classification in at least two
decisions which found no "compelling state interest" in limiting in-
dividual opportunities on the basis of sex.75
The first United States v. York, stated that:
It is difficult to find any reason why adult women, as one of
the specific groups that compose humanity, should have a
lesser measure of protection than a racial group.7 6
69 Developments in the Law - Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REv. 1065 (1969).
70 F. S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920).
71 Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 667, 670 (1966).
72Van Dusartz v. Hatfield, 334 F. Supp. 870 (D. Minn. 1971).
"Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
74 See THE CHANGING ROLES OF MEN AND WOMEN (E. Dahlstrom ed. 1967); A. MONTAGU,
MAN'S MOST DANGEROUS MYTH 181-84 (4th ed. 1964); G. MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN
DILEMMA 1073-78 (2d ed. 1962); Murray & Eastwood, Jane Crowe and the Law; Sex Dis-
crimnation and Title VII, 34 GEo. WASH. L. Ri. 232, 235-42 (1965).
'Sail'cr Inn Inc. Y. Kirby, 5 CaI.3rd 1, 485 P.2d 529, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1971); United
States v. York, 281 F. Supp. 8 (D. Conn. 1968).
76281 F. Supp. 8, 14 (D. Conn. 1968).
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Using a "strict scrutiny" standard, the court held that a Con-
necticut statute providing for incarceration of women up to three
years for certain offenses was an invidious discrimination repugnant
to the equal protection of the laws because men who were convicted
of the same misdemeanors were subject to shorter senteneesfl
Although the court did not have to decide whether sex was a
suspect classification in Brenden v. Independent School Distriet,/ it
felt the decision of the California Supreme Court in Sail'er Inn V.
Kirby" was very persuasive, in Sail'er Inn the court stated:
Sex, like race and lineage, is an immutable trait, a status
into which the class members are locked by the accident of
birth. What differentiates sex from non-suspect statuses,
such as intelligence or physical disability, and aligns it with
the recognized suspect classifications is that the character-
istic frequently bears no relationship to ability to perform
or contribute to society. . . . The result is that the whole
class is relegated to an inferior status without regard to the
capabilities or characteristics of its individual members....
Where the relation between characteristic and evil to be pre-
vented is so tenuous, courts must look closely at classifica-
tions based on that characteristic lest outdated social stereo-
types result in invidious law or practices ...
Another characteristic which underlies all suspect classifica-
tions is the stigma of inferiority and second class citizenship
associated with them .... Women, like Negroes, aliens, and
the poor have historically labored under severe legal and
social disabilities. Like black citizens, they were, for many
years, denied the right to vote and, until recently, the right
to serve on juries in many states. They are excluded from
or discriminated against in employment and educational
opportunities ..-
The pedestal upon which women have been placed has all too
often, upon closer inspection, been revealed as a cage."°
The successful athletic cases have not had to reach this issue
yet, because they have determined that the defendants have not sus-
tained their burden of showing that a classification based on sex
77 Id. at 17.
*' 342 F. Supp. 1224 (D. Minn. 1972), asj'd, 497 F.2d 1292 (8th Cir. 1973).
* 5 Ca[.3d 1,485 P,2d 529, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1971).
S0 Id. at 19-20, 485 P.2d at 540-41, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 340-41.
[Vol. 22 :67(0
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bears a rational relationship to a state objective sought to be ad-
vanced by the operation of the rule treating the sexes differently. 1
In Reed v. Nebraska School Activities Ass'n, 2 the court allowed
a preliminary injunction in a proceeding to enjoin the interschool
activities association and school officials from prohibiting a female
student from parteipating on a boys' golf team. The judge held that
the evidence supported a conclusion that the plaintiff student would
probably be successful on the merits.8 3 The court saw the issue to be
not whether she has a "right" to play golf, but whether she can be
treated differently from boys in an activity provided by the state. 4
This court distinguished cases' 5 which assume schools and activ-
ities associations may make any rule they choose to make, and also
that students have only "privileges" related to sport activities. Such
assumptions are untenable in matters of federal constitutional law. 6
On balancing the interests of the two parties, the court accorded
the interests of the plaintiff - value of local and regional competi-
tion, opportunity to enhance her reputation, instruction by the coach-
ing staff - as outweighing those of defendants: enforcement of rules
unfettered by student attacks, and financial savings. In addition, a
finding that plaintiff's benefits were fixed in time to the present
golf season persuaded the court to find sufficient irreparable injury
to grant the preliminary injunction. 7
A month later, in May, 1972, a court allowed not only a pre-
liminary but a permanent injunction with a holding limited to the
specific facts presented. The decision in Brenden v. Independent
School District88 is limited to a situation wherein plaintiff high school
girls wished to take part in certain interseholaste boys' athletics
(tennis, cross-country track and skiing). It was shown that the girls
could compete effectively on these teams, and there were no alter-
native competitive programs sponsored by their schools which would
provide an equal opportunity for competition for these girls. There-
fore, application of a rule prohibiting girls from participating in
boys' interscholastic athletic programs as to plaintiffs was arbitrary
and unreasonable in violation of the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment.9
Si Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
2341 F. Supp. 258 (D. Neb. 1972).
I21d. at 262.
841d.
05 Id.
" Id.
'1d. at 262-63.
11342 F. Supp. 1224 (D. Minn. 1972),ay'd, 477 F.2d 1292 (8th Cir. 1973).
89Id. at 1234.
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The court was extremely careful to indicate just what the case
did not decide. It did not have to decide whether participation in
sports is fundamental, whether sex was a suspect classification, or
whether the League rules were unconstitutional or constitutional. 0
Stressing the fact that the case was not a class action, the court
emphasized that the decision applied only to the two plaintiffs. There-
fore, the acknowledged substantial physiological differences between
males and females presented by defendants' expert witnesses were
not relevant to a determination of this case because evidence showed
that the two plaintiffs could competently compete on the boys' teams.
Even so, the court ruled:
There has been no evidence that either Peggy Brenden or
Tony St. Pierre, or any other girls, would be in any way
damaged from competition in boys interscholastic athletics,
nor is there any credible evidence that the boys would be
damaged. (emphasis added) 1
A successful class action suit obtaining injunctive relief was
Haas v. South Bend Community School Corp.2 The case concerned
the application of a rule prohibiting male and female students from
competing on the same team or against each other only in non-contact
sports such as golf, swimming, tennis, track, and gymnastics.9
Acknowledging evidence that males generally tend to possess a
higher degree of athletic ability than females, the court found that
such a classification appears reasonable on its face. However, a rule
or law which appears to be non-discriminatory on its face may never-
theless be struck down as a denial of equal protection if it is un-
reasonably discriminatory in its operation.94
Therefore, the court ruled that where the great majority of
high schools in the state did not maintain interscholastic athletic
programs for girls, the present application of the IIISAA rule deny-
ing "mixed" competition in non-contact sports must be struck down
as a denial of equal protection. The court found no reason to justify
denying female high school students "the opportunity to qualify" for
participation with males in interscholastic athletics on non-contact
teams, notwithstanding differences in athletic ability or contentions
that the rule was necessary to protect girls' athletics and that costs
would increase.'
"Id. at 1231.
91 fd. at 1233.
1289 N.E.2d 495 (Ind. 1972).
91Id. at 498.
'
t Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
9 Haas v. South Bend Community School Corp., 289 N.E.2d 495, 500-01 (Ind. 1972).
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A very recent case in this area is a decision of the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals decided on January 25, 1973-Morris v.
Michigan Board of Education.6 This case was a class action by girls
desiring to participate in interscholastic athletics involving non-con-
tact sports. The District Judge's preliminary injunction appeared on
its face to apply to contact and non-contact sports alike. Therefore,
in affirming the preliminary injunction, the Circuit Court modified
the decision to apply to non-contact sports only. The court also took
judicial notice that the public policy of the state of Michigan by legis-
lative enactment allows females to participate with males in non-
contact athletic activities as of spring, 1973.11
Conclusion
Whether by legislative or judicial discussion, participation by
females on traditionally all-male teams is an issue of much controversy.
The fear of some directors of state associations is that female
teams will be eliminated completely, in that if women can participate
on male teams, then males should be allowed to try out for female
teams. Therefore, the logic follows that because of the acknowledged
physiological differences between males and females, many boys who
may not have been good enough to qualify for the male teams could
easily have greater ability in various areas than any girls, and thus,
make the girls' teams which, in effect, would become male teams.
One possible solution would be that in organized, interscholastic,
competitive contests there should be no rules limiting participation
on the basis of sex. Individual ability should be the only criterion.
These schools should also provide two other intramural teams. Stu-
dents would qualify for the A team on the basis of ability; whereas,
any student should be able to participate on the B team. Although
the effect may be to have an all male A team and an all female B
team, the program would be non-discriminatory, as all students would
have the opportunity to qualify for all teams.
Another possible solution - the most radical, but most equitable
-would be to have co-educational physical education. Many schools
have co-educational physical education through elementary school
and then divide the students on the basis of sex when they reach
junior high. Possibly, with combined physical education programs
the evidence of "physiological differences" between the sexes would
1472 F.2d 1207 (6th Cir. 1973).
97 Id.
1MicH. CoMe. LAWS ANN. §340.379 (2) (West. Supp. 1973).
19731
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no longer be as valid. Such physical education programs may enable
boys and girls to become capable of competing effectively with
and against one another, thereby eliminating any need for separate
programs according to sex. Until such a program is tried, the real
issues may never be settled.
The issue of non-contact sports is still to be resolved, with con-
tact sports waiting in the wings.
Sandra Wient
t Law Review Editor, third-yeai student, The Cleveland State University College of Law.
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